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V 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Saiyoth Chongphaisane pied guilty to possession of a controlled substance. He 
appeals from the district court's order awarding restitution pursuant to I.C. § 37-2732(k), 
claiming several errors in, and underlying, that order. First, he contends that the plain 
meaning of the term salary is unambiguous, and the common use of the term 
demonstrates that it does not include the fringe benefits of employment. Even if the 
term "regular salaries" is ambiguous in that regard, the applicable maxims of statutory 
construction reveal that fringe benefits of employment are not included in the scope of 
the restitution statute. Finally, Mr. Chongphaisane contends that restitution for the 
fringe benefits of employment is not authorized under the relevant statutes. The State's 
response-that the statute should be read expansively, to the point that benefits are 
included within "regular salaries" -does not promote the ordinary, everyday definitions 
of those terms nor is it line with the maxims of statutory construction and so should be 
rejected. 
Second, Mr. Chongphaisane contends that the district court abused its discretion 
by reopening the evidentiary portion of the restitution hearing three times, so as to allow 
the State to present additional evidence without inquiring, as it was obligated to do, 
whether there was a reasonable excuse for the State's failure to present that evidence 
during the initial hearing. In fact, the State had no reasonable excuse because the 
prosecutor made the conscious decision to not present that evidence at the initial 
hearing. The State contends that the first and third reopenings are not properly 
preserved for appeal. However, as the cases make clear, the district court needs to 
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conduct an inquiry to determine if there was a reasonable excuse for not presenting the 
evidence sought to be introduced during the reopening. As the district court did not 
conduct such a hearing on the first reopening motion, its decision falls outside the 
scope of its discretion and must be remedied, regardless of whether there was a 
contemporaneous objection to the State's motion to reopen. Regardless, the evidence 
presented at that hearing was not sufficient to justify the restitution award ordered by 
the district court. Additionally, there was a contemporaneous objection at the State's 
second motion to reopen, on which the district court entered an unqualified, adverse 
ruling. As a result, the issue of whether the State could properly present evidence after 
the close of its case-in-chief was preserved for appeal and Mr. Chongphaisane was not 
required to renew his objection when the court took contrary action. That means the 
issue of whether the second and third reopenings were appropriate were preserved. 
Additionally, the State contends there was no issue on the merits of this issue 
because the district court is allowed to reasonably delay the hearing, and there was no 
unreasonable delay. That argument grossly misconstrues the issue, which is whether, 
after the hearing is concluded, it was proper to allow the State three more attempts to 
put sufficient evidence in the record to support its claim after making the conscious 
decision to not present that evidence at the hearing. Furthermore, the statute on which 
the State relies only defines the scope of the district court's discretion before the 
restitution hearing occurs. Its purpose is to allow the prosecutor to marshal her 
information and make a sufficient presentation of the restitution claim to the district 
court. The scope of the district court's discretion after that hearing occurs is governed 
by a different set of rules, which reveal that the district court abused its discretion in this 
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case by failing to even inquire as to whether the State had a reasonable excuse for its 
failure to present sufficient evidence. Because the prosecutor made the conscious 
choice not to present the evidence in question, the State did not have a reasonable 
excuse, nor did the State proffer any argument on that point on appeal. 
Third, Mr. Chongphaisane contends that, when the record is properly limited to 
the evidence the State presented at the initial evidentiary hearing, there is insufficient 
evidence to support the restitution award, since all the evidence is speculative. The 
State contends that the evidence, even based only on estimations and approximations, 
was sufficient. However, even were this a situation where estimations and 
approximations could meet the State's prima facie burden of proof (which it is not 
because the State could have calculated the actual loss) the evidence presented was 
neither based on reliable methods of calculation nor premised on the best information 
available. Therefore, the requirements for the exception allowing estimations and 
approximations to be sufficient proof of restitution have not been met. The evidence the 
State presented at the evidentiary hearing, even after the first reopening of that hearing, 
was insufficient because the prosecutor made the conscious decision to not present the 
best evidence available. As such, Mr. Chongphaisane requests that this Court vacate 
the restitution order, and if it determines that remand is necessary, that the case only be 
remanded for the limited purpose of calculating the proper restitution award in regard to 
only Officer Keely and Ms. Weddle. 1 
1 The State should not be allowed to present the evidence it unreasonably failed to 
present at the initial evidentiary hearing on remand simply because Mr. Chongphaisane 
prevails on his appeal, if in fact, this Court determines the limited remand to be 
necessary at all. 
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Therefore, Mr. Chongphaisane respectfully requests this Court vacate the 
restitution order in this case. Should this Court determine remand is necessary, he 
requests that the case be remanded with the proper limitation. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Chongphaisane's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply 
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1. VVhether the district court erred by allowing the State to include the fringe 
benefits of employment in the calculation of "regular salaries" at the restitution 
hearing. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by reopening, not once, but three 
times, the restitution hearing as the State provided no valid justification to reopen 
the hearing so as to present additional evidence which it could have presented, 
but did not, during the initial hearing. 
3. Whether the district court erred in awarding restitution in this case because there 
was insufficient evidence to support the restitution award. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred By Allowing The State To Include The Fringe Benefits Of 
Employment In The Calculation Of "Regular Salaries" At The Restitution Hearing 
A. Introduction 
The State makes several attempts to justify the improper restitution award in this 
case, but none are persuasive. First, the plain language of the statute, particularly the 
common, everyday definition of the term "salary" reveals that the benefits of 
employment are not within the scope of the statute. The State's broad and conclusory 
assertions to the contrary do not withstand a detailed review of the terms. Because the 
terms of the statute are not ambiguous, they must be given their plain meanings, which 
do not include fringe benefits of employment, and therefore, the award of restitution 
including those benefits is beyond the scope of the statute and must be vacated. 
Second, even if the term "salary" is ambiguous, application of the principles of 
statutory construction reveal that the legislative intent was not to include fringe benefits 
in the scope of this statute, but rather, to only include those costs for the time state 
agents spent working on a particular offense. Since the benefits are not related to the 
officer's actions in regard to any particular offense or project, they are not within the 
scope of the statute. As such, the State's reading of the statute, which ignores those 
maxims of statutory construction, is erroneous. 
Third, the fundamental principle underlying the concept of restitution is that the 
amount awarded as restitution must be to address a loss actually caused by the 
defendant's culpable action. The State ignores this fundamental principle in all its 
assertions that I.C. § 37-2732(k) allows for recovery of fringe benefits of employment. 
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The evidence given in this matter was clear: the employees whose salaries were being 
requested as restitution would have received those fringe benefits regardless of which 
case they were working on. As such, the payment of fringe benefits was not related to, 
much less caused by, Mr. Chongphaisane's culpable conduct. 
Therefore, under any line of analysis, the fringe benefits of employment cannot 
be awarded as restitution under the relevant statutes. Because the restitution order in 
this case includes those benefits, it exceeds the authority granted by statute, and this 
Court should vacate the restitution order. 
B. When Given Its Plain, Everyday Definition, The Term "Regular Salary" Does Not 
Include Other Benefits Of Employment 
Where the terms of the statute are not ambiguous, they will be given their plain 
meanings. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 895-96 (2011). 
The term "salary" is not ambiguous and does not include the fringe benefits of 
employment. The common definition of what is included in the "salary" hinges on 
whether the payment is for services, based on the time worked or quantity produced. 
(See App. Br., p.14 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 631, 767 (3rd pocket ed. 2006).) 
Conversely, the definition of the term "benefit" in regard to employment scenarios 
(specifically identified as a "fringe benefit"), is "[a] benefit (other than direct salary or 
compensation) received by an employee from an employer such as insurance, a 
company car, or a tuition allowance." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 67 (emphasis added).2 
2 There are other definitions of the term "benefit," as well as other specific uses listed 
which are not applicable to this situation. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 67. 
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As such, by their common definitions alone, the term "salary" does not include the fringe 
benefits of employment. 
Furthermore, the Legislature has actually made such distinctions between 
"salaries" and "benefits" in other parts of the Idaho Code. See, e.g., I.C. § 59-1302(31); 
I.C. § 33-1272. The fact that these provisions are elsewhere in the Idaho Code, and 
thus, are not controlling in regard to this analysis, see, e.g., State v. Yzaguirre, 144 
Idaho 471, 477 (2007), does not mean they are completely inapplicable to the 
understanding of I.C. § 37-2732(k), as the State contends. (Resp. Br., p.10.) That is 
because those other statutes provide insight into the common, everyday meaning of the 
terms because it shows how the Legislature has actually used the terms in similar 
contexts. See Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho at 477 (noting that, '[w]here the legislature has not 
provided a definition in the statute, terms in the statute are given their common, 
everyday meanings"). 
Most notably, those statutes reveal that the term "salary" is not meant to include 
payment for vacation, sick leave, and bonuses. See I.C. § 59-1302(31)(C)(b). Rather, 
"salary" is understood to be one part of the overall "compensation" provided to 
employees. See I.C. § 33-1272(4)-(5). The other part, which is the vacation time, sick 
leave, and the like, are understood to be included in the term "benefits." Id. These 
statutes provide insight on the common usage of the terms and are consistent with the 
actual definitions of those terms. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 67, 631, 767. As a 
result, those statutes further reveal that "benefits" are not commonly understood to be 
included within "salary." In fact, that distinction is the reason that a report in regard to 
the open district court position in the First District states: "The annual salary for the 
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position $109,300 plus benefits." Keith Kinnaird, 14 Vying for Magistrate Post, Bonner 
County Daily Bee, 1, 2013, http://www.bonnercountydailybee.com/news/local/ 
article_ca4fde82-6c3e-11e2-bbf6-0019bb2963f4.html (emphasis added). As evidenced 
by the common usage of these terms, the term "salary" does not include the extra 
benefits of employment. See, e.g., id. 
Therefore, based on the unambiguous, common, everyday definition of the term 
salary, the fringe benefits of employment are not within the scope of I.C. § 37-2732(k), 
and therefore, the order of restitution including such awards must be vacated. 
C. If The Term "Salary" Is Ambiguous, Application Of The Principles Of Statutory 
Construction Reveal That The Fringe Benefits Of Employment Are Not 
Authorized Under I.C. § 37-2732(k) 
Additionally, reading the statute as the State does violates two principles of 
statutory interpretation recognized by the Idaho courts, specifically, "expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius"3 (hereinafter, expressio unius) and "noscitur a sociis."4 These two 
3 "[T]he expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." Saint Alphonsus 
Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assoc., LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 487 (2009). In 
State v. Gardiner, the Court of Appeals applied this maxim to the general restitution 
statute, I.C. § 19-5304(e), in regard to the term "victim," which at that time, did not 
include insurers or service providers. State v. Gardiner, 127 Idaho 156, 165-66 (Ct. 
App. 1995). Because insurers were not listed in the provision defining victims, the Court 
of Appeals held that the maxim of expression unius excluded them from recovering as 
victims. Id. at 166. As a result of this reading of the plain language of the statute, the 
Legislature added a provision to I.C. § 19-5304(e) expressly including insurers as 
"victims." See 1997 Idaho Session Laws Ch. 112. This comports with the requirement 
that courts give effect to the statute as written, leaving rectification of any 
misunderstandings in the language to the Legislature. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-
96. 
4 '"[A] word is known by the company it keeps."' State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 867 
(2011) (quoting State v. Hammersley, 134 Idaho 816, 821 (2000), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885, 893 (2004)). In Schulz, the Idaho Supreme 
Court applied the doctrine of noscitur a sociis to I.C. § 18-918(1 )(a), and determined 
that the common denominator in all the listed terms was cohabitation and an intimate 
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maxims reveal that the context of the surrounding terms in the list informs the statutory 
limitations on the term in question. While not applicable in every situation or as a rule of 
law, these maxims provide guidelines on how statutory lists are to be read in Idaho. 
See, e.g., Hewson v. Asker's Thrift Shop, 120 Idaho 164, 166-67 (1991). They do apply 
in this situation, however, to reveal that fringe benefits are not within the scope of 
LC.§ 37-2732(k). Compare Schulz, 151 Idaho at 867. 
I.C. §37-2732(k) provides: 
Upon conviction of a felony or misdemeanor violation under this chapter or 
[other specific code sections], the court may order restitution for costs 
incurred by law enforcement agencies in investigating the violation .... 
Costs shall include, but not be limited to, those incurred for the purchase 
of evidence, travel and per diem for law enforcement officers and 
witnesses throughout the course of the investigation, hearings and trials, 
and any other investigative or prosecution expenses actually incurred, 
including regular salaries of employees. 
Id. The specific terms designated in the statute are "purchase of evidence," "travel and 
per diem for law enforcement officers and witnesses," "hearings and trials," and "any 
other investigative or prosecution expenses actually incurred," an example of which are 
"regular salaries." Id. Therefore, according to the doctrine of expressio unius, the 
designation of these things excludes all others. See, e.g., Saint Alphonsus Diversified 
Care, 148 Idaho at 487; Gardiner, 127 Idaho at 165-66. The doctrine of noscitur a 
sociis informs which "things" are designated and which are not. See Schulz, 151 Idaho 
at 867. 
relationship. Schulz, 151 Idaho at 867. As a result, that statute was inapplicable to 
other situations not specifically listed in the statute which did not share that common 
denominator. Id. Therefore, even though a parent and child may be co-habiting, 
because they were not in an intimate relationship, that relationship did not fall within the 
scope of I.C. §18-918(1 )(a) because it did not share the common denominator with the 
other terms listed in the statute. See Schulz, 151 Idaho at 867. 
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As in I.C. § 18-918(1)(a), the terms in I.C. § 37-2732(k) have a common 
denominator, which is articulated in the catch-all provision they are all costs that the 
State incurs when the officer spends time on a particular investigation. See I.C. § 37-
2732(k). For example, when an officer needs to purchase evidence to forward the case, 
or when he needs to travel to a hearing in the subsequent prosecution, the statute 
allows the State to recover the costs of that investigation or prosecution. See id. 
Implicated in those costs (as indicated by the language of the statute) is the salary for 
the officer's time investigating that offense. See id. As with I.C. § 18-918(1 )(a), there 
are two parts to that common denominator: "spending of time" and "attributable to a 
particular offense." If the proposed term does not share both aspects of that common 
denominator, it does not fall within the scope of the statute. See Schulz, 151 Idaho at 
867. In this case, while, as the State correctly points out, the fringe benefits are a result 
of the officer spending time at his job (see Resp. Br., pp.9-10), the State's own witness 
testified that those costs are not attributable to a particular offense. (Tr., Vol.2, p.31, 
Ls.9-12.) Therefore, the fringe benefits do not share the common denominator with the 
terms listed in the statute. As a result, it is excluded from the scope of the statute. 
Poison Creek Pub/'g, Inc. v. Cent. Idaho Publ'g, Inc., 134 Idaho 426, 429 (Ct. App. 
2000). 
Therefore, in this case and based on any line of analysis, the award of restitution 
which includes the fringe benefits of employment, was issued without the necessary 
statutory authority and must be vacated. See, e.g., Gonzales, 144 Idaho at 776; Card, 
146 Idaho at 114; Nienburg, 153 Idaho at 495. 
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D. I.C. § 37-2732(k) Provides No Authorization For Restitution Awards For The 
Fringe Benefits Of Employment Because Such Costs Are Not Caused By The 
Defendant's Culpable Conduct 
The State erroneously contends that the statute in question, I.C. § 37-2732(k), 
authorizes restitution awards for the fringe benefits paid to State employees, even 
though the evidence reveals that those benefits are not paid because the officer 
worked on a particular case. However, as the Idaho Supreme Court has held, 
restitution awards made pursuant to I.C. § 37-2732(k) must still comply with the general 
principles of restitution established in regard to the general restitution statute, I.C. § 19-
5304. State v. Gomez, 125 Idaho 253, 258 (2012). That includes the causation 
requirement - the loss must actually and proximately be caused by the defendant's 
culpable action, and where it is not, restitution is inappropriate. See, e.g., 
State v. Gonzales, 144 Idaho 775, 776 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Card, 146 Idaho 111, 
114 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491, 495 (Ct App. 2012), reh'g 
denied. 
Nevertheless, the State asserts that, because I.C. § 37-2732(k) says that the 
costs available in restitution '"shall include, but not be limited to, those [costs] incurred 
for the purchase of evidence, travel and per diem .. , and any other investigative or 
prosecution expenses actually incurred, including regular salaries of employees," the 
statute should be read broadly to include fringe benefits of employment. (Resp. 
Br., pp.9-10 (quoting I.C. § 37-2732(k)).) This argument ignores the pertinent language 
of the statute- "any other investigative or prosecution expenses actually incurred, 
including regular salaries." I.C. § 37-2732(k) (emphasis added). As such, "regular 
salaries" are a description of an investigative or prosecution expense. The provisions of 
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I.C. § 37-2732(k), when read properly, actually comports with the causation requirement 
because investigation and prosecution costs are necessarily a result of the alleged 
culpable conduct and which are awarded only after a finding of guilt in that regard. 
However, the fringe benefits cannot, in any context, be said to constitute an 
"investigative or prosecution expense," or more basically, be said to be caused by the 
culpable conduct. In fact, Ms. Laura Weddle (the State's primary witness in regard to its 
restitution claim) provided testimony to the contrary: the fringe benefits are not based 
on the specific services provided, nor are they based on the actual hours the employee 
worked. (See Tr., Vol.2, p.31, Ls.9-12.) Rather, she testified that the officer in question 
would receive the fringe benefits "regardless of exactly who [he] investigates or what 
he investigates ... And his benefits are paid to him regardless whether he works 
overtime or not." (Tr., Vol.2, p.31, Ls.9-12 (defense counsel positing these assertions to 
Ms. Weddle during cross examination, and Ms. Weddle confirming that they were true 
statements).) Therefore, the evidence presented at the hearing reveals that the fringe 
benefits were not related, in any way, to the investigation or prosecution of 
Mr. Chongphaisane's actions, much less caused by his culpable conduct. 
Therefore, as the fringe benefits are not caused by the culpable conduct, they 
are not investigatory costs, and consequently, not included in the scope of the statute, 
even when read at its broadest. See I.C. § 37-2732(k). As such, they are not an 
authorized award in the statute, and the order awarding them exceeds the statutory 
authority and must be vacated. See, e.g., Gonzales, 144 Idaho at 776; Card, 146 Idaho 
at 114; Nienburg153 Idaho at 495. 
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11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Reopening, Not Once, But Three Times, 
The Restitution Hearing As The State Provided No Valid Justification To 
Reopen The Hearing So As To Present Additional Evidence Which It 
Could Have Presented, But Did Not, During The Initial Hearing 
A. Introduction 
There was no reasonable excuse for the prosecutor's failure to present sufficient 
evidence during the initial evidentiary hearing. In fact, the prosecutor admitted that she 
made the conscious choice to not present the evidence which the State later sought to 
admit. All three times that the district court reopened the evidentiary hearing to allow 
the State to try and prove its restitution request are properly before this Court. First, 
because, as Printcraft and Cogeneration establish,5 the outer boundaries on the district 
court's discretion in reopening cases requires an inquiry into whether the moving 
party has a reasonable excuse to justify reopening the hearing. As the district court 
conducted no such inquiry at any point in this case, its decision constitutes an abuse 
of discretion whether or not the State's motion to reopen was accompanied by a 
contemporaneous objection. 
However, as the State admits, the second motion was accompanied by a 
contemporaneous objection based on the fact that the State had already rested its case 
in chief regarding its restitution request, and therefore, the presentation of new evidence 
was untimely and inappropriate. Because the district court entered an unconditioned, 
adverse ruling on that objection, asserting that it ceuld reopen the hearing at any time, 
Mr. Chongphaisane was not required to renew that objection when the district court took 
5 Printcraft Press, Inc. v. Sunnyside Park Util., Inc., 153 Idaho 440, 458 (2012), reh'g 
denied, and Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 744 (2000). 
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subsequent adverse action in accordance with its decision. The issue of whether the 
State could properly present evidence after the close of its case-in-chief was preserved 
for appeal. As such, all the district court's subsequent decisions to reopen the hearing 
and allow the State to present more evidence are preserved for appellate review. 
Furthermore, the State's only responses to the merits of Mr. Chongphaisane's 
arguments are inaccurate applications of the law. Primarily, the State asserts that 
I.C. § 19-5304(6) allows the district court a reasonable time before entering a restitution 
order. However, that statute has been specifically interpreted to apply to the time 
between the judgment of conviction and the request for restitution, as it was designed to 
allow the prosecutor to marshal her evidence and make a sufficient request for 
restitution. That rule does not apply to the scope of the district court's discretion after it 
has afforded the prosecutor that reasonable period of time and she has completed her 
restitution request, making the conscious decision to not present certain evidence in the 
process. This is not an issue, as the State seems to believe, of unreasonable delay in 
issuing a restitution order. It is a question of whether the district court can continue to 
allow the State to present more evidence without a reasonable excuse once it has made 
its full evidentiary presentation, presenting the evidence it intended and not presenting 
the evidence it consciously chose not to present, and then rested its case. And to that 
issue, the State presented no argument, waiving any such contention on the issue. 
Therefore, this Court should find that the district court abused its discretion in reopening 
the evidentiary period on each of the three occasions the State requested and limit the 
record accordingly. 
15 
B. The District Court Erred In Reopening The Evidentiary Portion Of The February 
15, 2012, Hearing By Not Performing The Full, Necessary Inquiry, Specifically, 
By Not Requiring The State To Proffer A Justification For The Reopening 
In the restitution context, the district court is not required to enter a restitution 
order at the time of sentencing if it is reasonable and necessary to allow the parties "to 
locate all victims and correctly compute the amount of restitution." State v. Ferguson, 
138 Idaho 659, 661-62 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing I.C. § 19-5304(2)).6 I.C. § 19-5304(6) is 
a procedural mechanism which defines the scope of the district court's discretion in that 
regard by establishing a time frame in which the district court "may entertain a request 
for restitution .... " State v. Jensen, 149 Idaho 758, 762 (Ct. App. 2010) (emphasis 
added). As such, it allows the district court to delay entering a restitution order until the 
parties have had the opportunity to marshal their evidence and present their request for 
restitution or opposition thereto. See id. However, I. C. § 19-5304(6) does not define the 
scope of the district court's discretion once a party has made its request, offered the 
proof it wants to, and rested its case: "this section contemplates that the court may 
need to grant the prosecution a reasonable amount of time necessary to gather 
information so as to locate all victims and correctly compute the amount of 
restitution." Jensen, 149 Idaho at 762 (quoting Ferguson, 138 Idaho at 662) 
(emphasis in italics from original; emphasis in bold added). As such, I.C. § 19-5304(6) 
does not, as the State contends (Resp. Br., pp.12-14),7 impact the scope of the district 
6 The statutory provision dealing with the timing of the restitution hearing and order is 
actually controlled by I.C. § 19-5304(6). 
7 This issue is not one of improper delay in issuing a restitution order, as the State 
seems to believe. (See Resp. Br., pp.14-15.) It is an issue of whether the district court 
acted outside the bounds of its discretion by allowing the State to reopen the evidence 
three times in an attempt to put sufficient evidence before the district court after it 
presented all the evidence it had wanted to, but which the district court indicated, was 
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court's authority once the prosecution has had a reasonable opportunity to marshal its 
evidence but fails to present sufficient evidence at the hearing as a result of its own 
choices in that regard. 
Rather, the scope of the district court's discretion after a party has been afforded 
the opportunity to present evidence, has done so, and has rested its case in that regard 
is governed by a different set of rules. The district court is authorized to reopen a 
hearing upon the request of a party, but that party "must show some reasonable 
excuse, such as oversight, inability to produce the evidence, or ignorance of the 
evidence."8 Cogeneration, ·134 Idaho at 744. In this case, the State moved to reopen 
the evidentiary portion of the hearing. (Tr., Vol.2, p.44, Ls.7-8.) Therefore, for the 
district court's decision to reopen that hearing to be within its discretion, it needed to 
comply with the obligation set forth in Cogeneration - to ensure the State had a 
reasonable excuse for its failure to present sufficient evidence before it rested its case.9 
Cogeneration, 134 Idaho at 744. 
not sufficient to support the award. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.2, p.43, L.21 - p.44, L.8.) This is 
an issue about whether prosecutors are to be afforded multiple bites at the apple when 
it comes to proving restitution claims. The State's arguments fail to address the issue in 
question or justify either the prosecutor's or district court's actions, and so should be 
rejected. 
8 The term "must" establishes a mandatory duty to act in a certain manner, whereas 
"may" would authorize, but not require, the proscribed action. Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 
841,848 (1995). 
9 For the district court's decision to be within its discretion, the district court must have 
(1) perceived the issue as one within its discretio11; (2) aeted within the boundaries of 
that discretion, "consistently with any legal standards applicable to the choices before 
it"; and (3) reached its decision through an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 
Idaho 598, 600 (1989). Cogeneration established the legal standards applicable to the 
choice before the district court, and so its requirements had to be satisfied for the 
district court's decision to be within the outer boundaries of its discretion. See 
id. Cogeneration established the rule, which the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed in 
July of 2012 (after the district court's decisions in this case). See Printcraft, 153 Idaho 
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The district court did not fulfill its obligation from Cogeneration. (See Tr., Vol.2, 
p.44, Ls.7-9 (immediately assenting to the prosecutor's request to reopen without any 
inquiry as to a reasonable excuse); R., p.55 (minutes of the February 15, 2012, 
indicating only thirty seconds elapsed between the prosecutor's request to reopen and 
Ms. Weddle's retaking the stand, with no comment by the district court in between).) 
Furthermore, the prosecutor had no reasonable excuse for the failure to present 
sufficient evidence initially. In fact, the prosecutor asserted that she had made the 
conscious choice to not present that evidence at the hearing: "the reason I didn't have 
Ms. Weddle bring the pay rate is because[,) in the state's view[,] her testimony that she 
looked at the accurate pay schedule, she did the math[,] and she added it up to the total 
figure is[,] from our perspective[,] enough."10 (Tr., Vol.2, p.55, Ls.9-14.) A conscious 
choice not to present certain evidence is not a reasonable excuse to justify reopening 
an evidentiary hearing in order to present that evidence. See Cogeneration, 134 Idaho 
at 744; see also Printcraft, 153 Idaho at 458. Additionally, the fact that the prosecutor 
chose not to present the evidence means it was both available to be presented and 
known to the prosecutor at the time of the hearing, which further demonstrates a lack of 
a reasonable excuse. See id. In fact, the State does not even attempt to promulgate a 
reasonable excuse for the failure to present the evidence at the proper time. 11 
(See generally Resp. Br.) Because the State provided no argument in response, 
at 458. Nevertheless, as Printcraft only discusses existing law, it is instructive on 
whether the district court satisfied the Cogeneration requirements. 
10 As will be explained in depth in Section Ill, infra, Mr. Chongphaisane contends that 
Ms. Weddle's testimony did not present sufficient evidence because it consisted of 
ranges and approximations of the various officers' pay rates, not their actual pay rates, 
thus making the restitution calculation impermissibly speculative. 
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Mr. Chongphaisane simply refers this Court back to his Appellant's Brief at pages 
16-24. 
C. The District Court Improperly Reopened The Restitution Hearing To Allow The 
State To Present Affidavits On Two Occasions 
1. Mr. Chongphaisane's Challenge To Both Affidavits Has Been Preserved 
For Appellate Review Because The District Court Entered An Unqualified 
Adverse Order To His Objection Based On The Timeliness Of The 
Presentation Of Evidence 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "[n]ormally, if a party makes his 
position known to the court he need not repeat his objection when the court takes 
contrary action." Lasselle v. Special Products Co., 106 Idaho 170, 173 (1983). Holding 
otherwise would exact a high toll on judicial proceedings in terms of waiver of 
arguments, and "it is certainly doubtful whether the benefit of a double warning to the 
trial judge is worth such a price." Id. at 173 n.2 (quoting Comment, Special Verdicts: 
Rule 49 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 Yale L.J. 483, 510 n.89 (1965).) 
As such, objections ordinarily need not be renewed once the district court has ruled on 
the objection. 12 Davidson v. Beco Corp., 112 Idaho 560, 563 (Ct. App. 1986), overruled 
on other grounds on review, 114 Idaho 107, 107-08 ( 1987). 
11 Having failed to present either argument or authority in regard to that argument, the 
State has waived argument on this issue. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996). 
12 Many of the cases discussing this issue do so in terms of an objection raised during a 
motion in limine and not at the subsequent presentation of the challenged evidencB-. 
However, the language of the courts does not limit the rule to only that factual scenario, 
but rather, speaks in terms of a denied objection to admissibility, which need not be 
renewed when the objected-to evidence is presented for admission. See, e.g., Kirk v. 
Ford Motor Co., 141 Idaho 697, 701-02 (2005) ("If, however, the trial court unqualifiedly 
rules on the admissibility of evidence prior to trial, no further objection is required to 
preserve the issue for appeal."); Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, supra note 2, 148 
Idaho at 494 (same). Rather, the Idaho Supreme Court articulated the scope of the 
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The critical point of inquiry is whether the district court has actually ruled on the 
party's initial objection. State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 699 (1988). The Hester Court 
pointed out that there is a critical difference between an unqualified pretrial ruling on 
admissibility and a qualified ruling which results from there being insufficient evidence to 
determine whether or not the evidence is admissible. Id. at 699-700. As a result, the 
Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Davidson rule for situations where the district court's 
previous ruling on admissibility was unqualified, but held that, where the previous ruling 
was deferred or qualified in some manner, only then was the party required to renew the 
objection to preserve the issue for appeal. Id. at 700. The Idaho courts have 
consistently affirmed and applied the Hester rule. See, e.g., Kirk, 141 Idaho at 701-02; 
Gunter v. Murphy's Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16, 25 (2005) (holding that where there is 
no objection at the presentation of the evidence and no decision on the same objection 
made previously, the issue is not preserved for appeal); Saint Alphonsus Diversified 
Care, 148 Idaho at 494; State v. Pickens, 148 Idaho 554, 557 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding, 
essentially, that once there is an adverse ruling on the motion to prevent admission or 
objection to the admission of the evidence, that issue is preserved for appeal and the 
objection need not be renewed at a later point) 
However, the Hester rule is issue-specific. State v. Higgins, 122 Idaho 590, 596 
(1992); State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 794 (Ct. App. 1997). In Higgins, the objection 
was founded on defense counsel's assertion that the evidence was not of the sort 
that required expert testimony. Higgins, 122 Idaho at 596. That objection, while not 
rule: "if a party makes his position known to the court he need not repeat his objection 
when the court takes contrary action." Lasselle, 106 Idaho at 173. Therefore, this rule 
is applicable to Mr. Chongphaisane's objections. 
20 
needing to be repeated at trial, did not preserve objections on other grounds to that 
same testimony, such as an objection premised on 1.R.E. 404(a). Id. Additionally, a 
party may waive the protection afforded by the Hester rule by presenting evidence 
which had previously been ruled inadmissible. Gray, 129 Idaho at 794. In Gray, the 
Court of Appeals held that, even had the defense received a favorable, unqualified 
pretrial ruling as to the admissibility of certain witness statements, the issue of 
admissibility was waived for appellate review when defense counsel elicited the 
statements in question during cross-examination of the witnesses. Id. However, 
merely conceding to the admission of evidence, or even admitting to the evidence rather 
than waiting to be impeached by it, does not waive the objection to that evidence. 
State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 634-35 (1998). 
In this case, Mr. Chongphaisane objected to the introduction of Ms. Waddle's 
subsequent evidence on the grounds of timeliness. (R., pp.62-63.) Specifically, he 
claimed that, "[b]ecause the State has already rested its case, any information 
contained in the Affidavit is untimely and should not be considered by the Court." 
(R., p.63 (emphasis added).) In so doing, Mr. Chongphaisane objected to the issue of 
admission of new evidence after the State rested its case as untimely. The district court 
entered an unqualified, adverse ruling at the subsequent hearing: "I have the inherent 
authority to reopen an evidentiary proceeding to allow the Court to receive additional 
information where there is information that has not yet been presented." (Tr., Vol.2, 
p.58, Ls.10-14.) It reaffirmed this position in its written order: "Contrary to 
[Mr.] Chongphaisane's contention, in a civil matter tried by the court, a court may 
re-open the matter and take additional evidence on its own motion." (Augmentation -
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Restitution Order, p.2 (citations omitted).) That order was filed on March 23, 2012. 
(Augmentation - Restitution Order, p.1.) The second affidavit, asserting essentially 
the same information, was not filed until March 26, 2012. (Augmentation - Weddle 
Affidavit, p.1.) Therefore, because there was an unqualified adverse ruling in regard 
to Mr. Chongphaisane's objection to the admission of new evidence premised on 
timeliness, he was not required to renew that objection when the district court took 
subsequent action in accordance with that issue in order to preserve the issue for 
appeal. See, e.g., Lasselle, 106 Idaho at 173; Hester, 114 Idaho at 699; Pickens, 148 
Idaho at 557. 
2. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Reopened The 
Evidentiary Hearing To Allow The Presentation Of Both Affidavits Without 
A Reasonable Excuse Offered By The State As To Why It Did Not Present 
That Evidence During The Hearing 
In regard to the affidavit proffered on February 21, 2012, the prosecutor admitted 
that she made the conscious decision to not present the affidavit during the evidentiary 
hearing. (See Tr., Vol.2, p.55, Ls.9-14.) As such, there is no reasonable excuse for the 
State's failure to present that evidence at the proper time during the evidentiary hearing. 
See Cogeneration, 134 Idaho at 744; see also Printcraft, 153 Idaho at 458. Additionally, 
the district court did not conduct the necessary inquiry before reopening the evidentiary 
hearing, thus failing to ensure the obligation set forth in Cogeneration was met. (See 
Section ll(B), supra.) As the State proffered no response in this regard (see generally 
Resp. Br.), it has waived any argument in that regard and Mr. Chongphaisane simply 
refers this Court back to his Appellant's Brief at pages 16-24. 
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In regard to the affidavit proffered on March 26, 201 an evidentiary hearing was 
held on March 21, 2012, 13 at which the prosecutor could have elicited testimony and 
presented evidence, but again, chose not to. (See Tr., Vol.2, p.59, Ls. 1.) Because 
the State should not have been allowed to reopen the evidentiary hearing based on 
the Cogeneration rule, the March 21, 2012, hearing was, in fact, unnecessary. See 
Cogeneration, 134 Idaho at 7 44; see a/so Printcraft, 153 Idaho at 458. Nevertheless, 
the State could have attempted to proffer the evidence during that hearing, rather than 
waiting and having to request a third reopening of the evidentiary hearing to admit the 
second affidavit. Additionally, the district court did not conduct the necessary inquiry 
before reopening the evidentiary hearing, thus failing to ensure the obligations set forth 
in Cogeneration were met. (See Section ll(B), supra.) Therefore, the State had no 
justification for its failure to offer the evidence at the appropriate time. As the State 
proffered no response in this regard (see generally Resp. Br.), it has waived any 
argument in that regard and Mr. Chongphaisane simply refers this Court back to his 
Appellant's Brief at pages 16-24. 
Because the district court abused its discretion by reopening the restitution 
hearing three times to allow the State three additional chances to present sufficient 
evidence to support its claim when it had made the conscious decision to not proffer 
that evidence in the first place, this Court should grant relief by limiting the record upon 
which a restitution award could be based to only the evidence properly presented during 
the State's case-in-chief at the initial restitution hearing. 
13 Defense counsel asserted that he had been trying to get that hearing vacated as 
unnecessary. (Tr., Vol.2, p.61, Ls.5-11.) 
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111. 
The District Court Erred In Awarding Restitution In This Case Because There 
Was Insufficient Evidence To Support The Restitution Award 
A. Introduction 
The evidence presented before the district court began to improperly reopen the 
hearing to allow the State to try and present evidence in support of its restitution request 
was insufficient to support the restitution award. The prosecutor offered no evidence as 
to the pay rates of most of the officers. The evidence the State offered for the two 
remaining employees for whom it was claiming restitution only consisted of 
approximations and estimations. Restitution, however, must not be based on 
speculative evidence, unless it is of a particular set of cases where determining the 
actual loss would be impossible. As this is not one such case, those approximations 
are not sufficient evidence to quantify the actual loss, and thus, are not sufficient 
evidence upon which to premise a restitution award. 
And even when improperly given the opportunity to provide additional evidence 
at that first hearing, the prosecutor only elicited more speculation, all approximations 
based off of what the various officers' call numbers were. That evidence, by the 
prosecutor's own admission was not presented with a reliable means of calculation, and 
was not based on the best evidence available (which the prosecutor had consciously 
chosen not to present at the hearing). Even the affidavits that were ultimately submitted 
are insufficient to support the award because they improperly include the employees' 
fringe benefits in their calculations. Because the State has failed to show a 
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preponderance of the evidence to support the restitution request, this Court should 
vacate the restitution order. 
B. The Evidence Properly Presented To The District Court Was Speculative And, 
Therefore, Insufficient To Support An Award Of Restitution 
Mr. Chongphaisane made several arguments in his Appellant's Brief as to 
why restitution awards could not properly be based on speculation and approximation. 14 
(See App. Br., pp.24-27.) Since that brief was filed, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
reiterated that restitution awards must be based on a preponderance of the evidence 
and must not be speculative. State v. Straub, Idaho _, 2013 Opinion No.2, 
Docket No. 38139, pp.9-10 (2012) (quoting l.C. § 19-5304(2)). In order to not be 
impermissibly speculative, the losses claimed in restitution need to be quantifiable. 
Id. at 10; compare State v. Higley, 151 Idaho 76, 79-80 (Ct. App. 2010) (awarding 
restitution where the evidence demonstrated a quantifiable loss of wages, thereby 
justifying restitution for that amount). 
14 The State does correctly point out that this argument varies depending on this Court's 
resolution of the argument presented in Section II, supra. (See Resp. Br., p.15.) 
However, as there were sufficient objections to preserve the challenges on timeliness, 
at least to the evidence submitted after the February 15, 2012, hearing (see Section 
ll(C)(1) supra, and the district court improperly reopened the evidentiary periods at 
those points, the only evidence that could potentially be properly be considered in 
regard to the sufficiency claim is that evidence presented on February 15, 2012. 
Additionally, Mr. Chongphaisane does not concede that the district court properly 
reopened the hearing even at the February 15, 2012, hearing, as the district court did 
not inquire after the State's excuse to justify its motion to reopen, as required by then--
existing Idaho Supreme Court precedent. See, Cogeneration, 134 Idaho at, 7 44. 
Because the State could not have justified that reopening (see Section 11(8), supra and 
App. Br., pp.16-24), the district court did not properly reopen the case at that time either. 
Furthermore, even if the affidavits were properly admitted, they are still 
inadequate to support the restitution awards because, as discussed in Section I, supra, 
they improperly include fringe benefits in the calculation. (See, e.g., Augmentation -
Affidavit of Laura Weddle, p.5.) 
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Notably, the prosecutor admitted that she failed to introduce sufficient evidence 
to support the restitution request when the district court began to articulate its decision 
in that regard. 15 (Tr., Vol.2, p.43, 21 - p.44, L.8 ("I did not elicit the dollar figure per 
officer."); Tr., p.56, Ls.3-5 ("And while it is not a precise mathematical formula that I put 
in front of you today, Your Honor .... ").) The district court however, indicated its 
agreement with defense counsel that the failure to present testimony regarding the pay 
rates of the other officers meant there was insufficient evidence to support an award in 
that regard. (Tr., Vol.2, p.43, L.21 - p.44, L.2 ("And the burden on -- there is something I 
will bring up. The burden is on the state to prove the basis for its restitution. Counsel 
has brought up a good point, I did not hear any testimony -- she certainly could have 
testified as to the rate, but I don't remember .... " (at which point the prosecutor 
interjected and moved to reopen so as to try and present sufficient evidence)).) 
Therefore, if the evidence is limited to only that presented before the prosecutor 
rested during the restitution hearing, the State has already effectively conceded that the 
evidence is insufficient to support the restitution award. There was no evidence at all as 
to the pay rates of any of the officers besides Officer Keely and Ms. Weddle. As 
15 The sum of the evidence the prosecutor had presented was Officer Keely's testimony 
that his rate of pay was around $38 per hour, but he was not sure of the exact figure, 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.17, Ls.6-7), Ms. Weddle's testimony that Officer Keely was mistaken 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.24, Ls.10-17), that Officer Keely's overtime pay rate was "approximately 
$42 per hour," (Tr., p.30, Ls.18-21), that that her rate of pay was either $20 or $21 per 
hour (depending on the inelusion of fringe- benefits of employement), (Tr., p.26, Ls.9-12; 
p.27, Ls.18-21 ), and, after being reminded by the district court, a document indicating 
the number of hours worked by various officers. (State's Exhibit 1; Tr., Vol.2, p.32, 
Ls.13-18.) Additionally, the revelation that the calculations were not precise (Tr., Vol.2, 
p.56, Ls.3-5), further demonstrates that the requested amounts are impermissibly 
speculative and unable to support a restitution award under the statutes. See Straub, 
_Idaho_, 2013 Opinion No.2, Docket No. 38139, pp.9-10. 
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such, there could have been no calculation of the amount of loss due to their work on 
Mr. Chongphaisane's case. And even the evidence as to Officer Keely's and 
Ms. Weddle's pay rates was uncertain and conflicting. Approximations of the loss are 
insufficient to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard as they do not 
constitute substantial evidence of what the actual loss was. See, e.g., State v. Taie, 
138 Idaho 878, 879 (Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing that restitution is only for the actual 
losses suffered). Therefore, the prosecutor failed to prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, a quantifiable amount of restitution at the first hearing, and therefore, the 
restitution award should be vacated. See Straub,_ Idaho_, 2013 Opinion No.2, 
Docket No. 38139, pp.9-10. 
Even if the evidence this Court considers includes the first reopening of the 
evidentiary hearing, the evidence presented is still impermissibly speculative, amounting 
to only estimation and approximation. The State asserts that "[t]here is no requirement 
that, in order to obtain restitution, the state has to present evidence of the pay rate for 
each officer - vis-a-vis having Ms. Weddle testify that she had earlier obtained and 
applied the officers' correct and relevant pay rates when she computed restitution." 
(Resp. Br., p.18 (emphasis from original).) That assertion is incorrect. Restitution is 
only permitted for the "actual economic loss suffered .... " See, e.g., Taie, 138 Idaho at 
879 (emphasis added). Estimations and approximations cannot, by their nature, prove 
the actual economic loss. 
Mr. Chongphaisane recognizes that there are certain situations where 
determining the actual loss is not possible based on the facts of the case 
(i.e., embezzlement over a long period of time), and therefore, estimations may 
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establish the preponderance of evidence necessary to support the restitution award. 
See, e.g., State v. Lombard, 149 Idaho 819, 823 (Ct. App. 2010). However, for such 
estimations to constitute sufficient evidence, they must be calculated of 
under the 
Id. First, this is not such a case where the actual loss is indeterminable (although the 
evidence presented by the State at the hearing is insufficient to actually make that 
determination). Ms. Weddle testified that she received the actual hours reported by the 
officers and their accurate rates of pay. (Tr., Vol.2, p.23, L.16 - p.24, L.9.) The 
prosecutor, however, made the conscious decision to not present the evidence of those 
numbers or Ms. Weddle's actual calculations with those numbers at the restitution 
hearing. (See Tr., p.55, Ls.9-14.) The fact that the State asserts the actual calculations 
were made means that the losses were actually determinable. Because the loss was 
determinable, the evidence presented at the hearing by the prosecutor's choice of 
approximations and estimations fails to establish the actual loss suffered. Cf Lombard, 
149 Idaho at 823. Therefore, because the restitution was based on speculation, it was 
erroneous and should be vacated. See, e.g., Straub, _ Idaho _, 2013 Opinion 
No.2, Docket No. 38139, pp.9-10. 
Second, even if this is a case where estimations may be used to establish the 
actual loss, the evidence that the State actually presented at the restitution hearing 
constituted neither a "reasonable method" nor was it based on the best evidence 
available. Compare Lombard, 149 Idaho at 823. As to the method of calculation, the 
prosecutor admitted at the restitution hearing that calculation described was not 
performed via "a precise mathematical formula .... " (Tr., Vol.2, p.56, Ls.3-4.) 
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Therefore, it is not a reasonable method of calculation. Compare Lombard, 149 Idaho 
at 823-24 (describing the precise mathematical formula the victim in that case used to 
calculate the actual loss claimed in restitution). Additionally, it was not based on the 
best evidence available. Ms. Weddle provided the estimations based off of the officers' 
call numbers, 16 even though, as she testified, she had been provided with 
documentation of their actual rates of pay. (Tr., Vol.2, p.24, Ls.3-9.) That document 
was the best available evidence as to the officers' rates of pay, but the State made the 
conscious decision to not present that evidence to the district court. (Tr., Vol.2, p.55, 
Ls.9-14.) Therefore, the evidence presented fails to constitute justifiable estimation or 
guesswork. Compare Lombard, 149 Idaho at 823-24. As such, its claim is speculative 
and, thus, the restitution award was erroneous. See Straub, 
Opinion No.2, Docket No. 38139, pp.9-10. 
Idaho , 2013 
16 The testimony as to the rates of pay at that time was purely speculative. For 
example, Officer "Terry Phillips is six -- his call number is 648, so he's approximately the 
same level a-s Officer Keely" was the sum total of the evidence presented in regard to 
Officer Phillips's rate of pay. (Tr., Vol.2, p.47, Ls.19-22; see generally Tr., Vol.2.) The 
most specific Ms. Weddle got in giving evidence was that officers' pay rates were 
"approximately" the same, and then she would tack on an estimated figure. (See Tr., 
Vol.2, p.46, L.8 - p.51, L.2.) Such evidence is insufficient to overcome the standard of 
proof, and therefore, fails to justify a restitution award. See Straub, _ Idaho _, 
2013 Opinion No.2, Docket No. 38139, pp.9-10. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Chongphaisane respectfully requests that this Court vacate the restitution 
order to BCPD in his case. If this Court determines that the issue needs to be 
remanded for further proceedings, he respectfully requests that the remand be limited to 
determine only the proper restitution as to Officer Keely and Ms. Weddle. 
DATED this 14th day of February, 2013. 
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